In this paper we study IL(PRA), the interpretability logic of PRA. As PRA is neither an essentially reflexive theory nor finitely axiomatizable, the two known arithmetical completeness results do not apply to PRA: IL(PRA) is not ILM or ILP. IL(PRA) does of course contain all the principles known to be part of IL(All), the interpretability logic of the principles common to all reasonable arithmetical theories. In this paper, we take two arithmetical properties of PRA and see what their consequences in the modal logic IL(PRA) are. These properties are reflected in the so-called Beklemishev Principle B, and Zambella's Principle Z, neither of which is a part of IL(All). Both principles and their interrelation are submitted to a modal study. In particular, we prove a frame condition for B. morover, we prove that Z follows from a restricted form of B. Finally, we give an overview of the known relationships of IL(PRA) to important other interpetability principles.
Introduction
The notion of a relativized interpretation occurs in many places in mathematics and in mathematical logic. If a theory T interprets a theory S, we shall write T £ S, which then, roughly, means that there is a translation · t from symbols in the language of S to formulas in the language of T such that any theorem of S becomes a theorem of T under the canonical extension of this translation to formulas. In the notion of interpretation that we are interested in, the logical structure of formulas has to be preserved under the translation. Thus, for example, (ϕ ∨ ψ) t = ϕ t ∨ ψ t and in particular ⊥ t = (∨ ∅ ) t = ∨ ∅ = ⊥. We refer the reader to [17] , [5] and [15] for precise definitions and examples.
In this paper, we shall not go much into the technical details of interpretations. Rather, we are interested in the structural behavior of this notion of interpretability. In particular, we are interested in the structural behavior of interpretability on sentential extensions of a certain base theory T . An easy example of such a structural property is the transitivity of interpretations:
(T + α £ T + β) ∧ (T + β £ T + γ) → (T + α £ T + γ).
We can use so-called interpretability logics to capture, in a sense, the complete structural behavior of interpretability between sentential extensions of a certain base theory. We shall soon say a bit more on this. For now it is important to note that for a large collection of theories, the interpretability logic is known.
We call a theory reflexive if it proves the consistency of any of its finite sub-theories (as sets of axioms). We call a theory essentially reflexive if any finite sentential extension of it is reflexive. It is easy to see that any theory with full induction, like Peano Arithmetic, is essentially reflexive. The interpretability logic of essentially reflexive theories was determined independently by Berarducci and Shavrukov ([4] , [13] ). We shall encounter this logic below under the name of ILM. The principle (A £ B) → (A ∧ PC £ B ∧ PC) which is the particular feature of this system. It is called Montagna's principle since it arose during the original discussions between Franco Montagna and Albert Visser about the modal principles underlying interpetability logic. It was known to Lindström andŠvejdar in arithmetic disguise before.
It turns out that theories which are finitely axiomatizable and which contain a sufficient amount of arithmetic, have a different interpretability logic which is called ILP. In [17] , the first proof was given.
For no theory that is neither finitely axiomatizable nor essentially reflexive, the interpretability logic is known. PRA is one such theory. In this paper, we shall make some first attempts to work out the interpretability logic of PRA.
As such, this paper also fits into a larger project. As pointed out above, different arithmetical theories have different interpretability logics. A question that is open since a long time concerns the logic of the core principles that pertain to all reasonable arithmetical theories -IL(All). As PRA is certainly a 'reasonable arithmetical theory', this core logic should also be a part of IL(PRA). In this paper we shall not focus too much on the principles in the core logic. Rather shall we consider the interpretability behavior of PRA that is typical for this theory.
One such principal that is characteristic for PRA is Beklemishev's principle that shall be studied closely in this paper. This principle exploits the fact that any theory which is an extension of PRA by Σ2 sentences is reflexive. We give a characterization of this principle in terms of the modal semantics for interpretability logics.
A topic that is closely related to interpretability logics, is that of Π1-conservativity logics. A theory S is Π1 conservative over a theory T in the same language of arithmetic, we shall write S £Π 1 T whenever S proves any Π1 theorem that is proven by T . In symbols: T π =⇒ S π for any π ∈ Π1. It is easy to see that for any Σ1 sentence σ, the following is a valid principle S £Π 1 T → S + σ £Π 1 T + σ. This principle is the basis for Montagna's principle for interpretability logic, and Beklemishev's principle which is studied in this paper is a restriction of Montagna's principle.
When T and S are both reflexive theories we have that S £ T ↔ S £Π 1 T . This equivalence was exploited by Hájek and Montagna who were the first to show that the Π1-conservativity logic of PA is ILM as well [10] . The observation about the equivalnce is more generally important when looking at the repercussions of Π1-conservativity principles on interpretability logics. In this paper we shall consider Zambella's principle for Π1-conservativity logics and look at its repercussions for the interpretability logic of PRA. We shall show that Zambella does not add new information in the sense that its modal-logical consequnces are already implied by Beklemishev's principle.
It is remarkable that the notion of interpretability is, in a sense, less stable than that of Π1-conservativity. Hájek and Montagna show that their results extends to all reasonable theories containing IΣ1. This was strengthened by Beklemishev and Visser in [3] : all theories extending the parameter-free induction schema IΠ − 1 have the same Π1-conservativity logic (ILM) whereas in this range the interpretability logics expose a diverse and wild behavior. Note though that PRA does not prove IΠ − 1 , and, in fact, the Π1-conservativity logic of PRA remains unknown.
A number of the results in this paper was first proved in [11] .
Arithmetic
Let us first fix some arithmetical notation. We use modal symbols P, Q, £ both in modal and arithmetical statements, here we fix their arithmetical meaning. We write, for an arithmetical sentence α, PTα for formalized provability in T, PT,nα for formalized provability of α in T using only nonlogical axioms with Gödel numbers ≤ n and formulas of logical complexity ≤ n. Dually, QTα = ¬PT¬α means formalized consistency of α over T (i.e. nonexistence of a proof of a contradiction from α), while QT,nα means ¬PT,n¬α. For theories T, S we use T £ S to denote formalized interpretability of S in T. For arithmetical sentences α, β, α £T β means T + α £ T + β. Similarly for theories T, S, £Π 1 denotes formalized Π1-conservativity of T over S and for arithmetical sentences α, β, α £Π 1 β means T + α £Π 1 T + β.
What is PRA?
In the literature there are many definitions of PRA around. Probably the best known definition uses a language that contains a function symbol for every primitive recursive function. The axioms contain the defining equations of these functions. Moreover, there are induction axioms for each ∆0-formula in this enriched language. Beklemishev has shown in [2] that PRA is in a strong sense equivalent (faithfully bi-interpretable) with (EA) Under this definition, the following lemma is immediate. 
The Orey-Hájek Characterizations for interpretability
All theories that are mentioned here are supposed to be consistent and have a poly-time recognizable axiomatization. Orey and Hájek have given several equivalent conditions on theories which express that the one interprets the other. In this subsection we shall briefly mention the one we shall need and refer to the literature for proofs. Lemma 2.2. Whenever T is reflexive we have that
Moreover in the presence of the totality of exponentiation this equivalence can be formalized.
T £ S ↔ ∀x PT ¬PS,x⊥
In [11] an overview is given of all the implications, corresponding requirements and necessary arguments regarding Orey-Hájek. In the above Lemma the ⇐ does not need the requirement of reflexivity and can actually be formalized in S 1 2 . For the other direction reflexivity is needed, and for its formalization, the totality of exp as well.
Note that, using the above characterization, the a-priori Σ3 notion of interpretability becomes Π2.
Modal logics and semantics
Similarly as formalized provability can be captured by modal provability logic, we can use modal logic to reason about formalized interpretability. Modal logic proved to be an extremely useful tool to reason about such formalized fenomena since it can visualize their behaviour using a simple language and an intuitive frame semantics. Perhaps the most significant point where modal logic shows its skills are completeness proofsarithmatical completeness proofs are based on modal completeness proofs obtained by rather standard method of model theory of modal logics. For more on material contained in this section we refer to [17, 11, 8] .
We will work with modal propositional language containing two modalities -a unary P modality for provability and a binary £ modality for interpretability. Modal interpretability formulas are defined as follows:
We will use standard abbreviations Q, ∨, ¬, , ↔, and we write A ≡ B instead of (A £ B) ∧ (B £ A).
An arithmetical interpretation of modal formulas is given by arithmetical realizations: for an arithmetical theory T, an arithmetical Trealization is a map * sending propositional variables p to arithmetical sentences p * . It is extended to interpretability modal formulas as follows: first * commutes with all boolean connectives. Moreover (PA) * = PT A * and (A £ B) * = A * £T B * , i.e. * translates modal operators to formalized provability and interpretability over T respectively.
An interpretability principle of an arithmetical theory T is a modal formula A such that ∀ * T A * . The interpretability logic of a theory T, denoted IL(T), is then the set of all the interpretability principles of T.
The logic IL
The logic IL is in a sense the core interpretability logic -it is a (proper) part of the interpretability logic of any reasonable arithmetical theory: IL ⊂ IL(T). It captures the basic structural behaviour of interpretability.
IL is defined as the smallest set of formulas containing all propositional tautologies, all instantiations of the following schemata, and is closed under the Necessitation and Modus Ponens rules:
Note that the part of IL not containing the £ modality is the wellknown Gödel-Löb provability logic GL, axiomatized by the first three schemata. It is easy to show that P can be defined in terms of £ modality:
More interpretability logics are obtained extending IL by new interpretability principles. Some of such principles are listed below:
All of these principles are in IL(All) except the principles M and P which were mentioned above already. For an overview, see [17] and [8] . For the last word on IL(All) see [9] .
For X a set of principles we denote ILX the logic extending IL with schemata from X.
There are some results considering arithmetical completeness of interpretability logics: it was shown in [4] , [13] that the interpretability logic of an essentially reflexive theory (as e.g. PA) is ILM. For finitely axiomatizable theories containing supexp the interpretability logic is known to be ILP ( [16] ).
An important consequence of ILM that expresses the Π1-conservativity of interpretability more directly is (A £ QB) → P(A → QB).
Modal semantics
Modal frame semantics of interpretability logics is based on GL-frames extended with a ternary accesibility relation interpreting the binary £ modality. The ternary relation is however given by a set of binary relations indexed by the nodes: Definition 3.1. An IL-frame (a Veltman frame) is a triple W, R, S where W is a nonempty universe, R is a binary relation on W , and S is a set of binary relations on W , indexed by elements of W such that 1. R is transitive and conversely well-founded 2. ySxz → xRy&xRz 3. xRy → ySxy
where W, R, S is a IL-frame and is a subset of W × Prop, extending to boolean formulas as usualy and to modal formulas as follows:
We adopt standard definitions of validity of a modal formula in a model and in a frame. Moreover, let X be a scheme of interpretability logic. We say that a formula C in first or higher order logic is a frame condition for X if, for each frame F , F |= C iff F |= X.
Let us list some known frame conditions (to be read universally quanti-
We have the following completeness results: IL is sound and complete w.r.t. (finite) IL frames, ILP is complete w.r.t. (finite) ILP frames (all in [6] ), ILW is complete w.r.t. (finite) ILW frames ( [7] , see also [8] ), ILM is complete w.r.t. (finite) ILM frames (in [6] , also in [4] ),
Beklemishev's principle
It is possible to write down a valid principle specific for the interpretability logic of PRA. This was first done by Beklemishev (see [17] ). Beklemishev's principle B exploits the fact that any finite Σ2-extension of PRA is reflexive, together with the fact that we have a good Orey-Hájek characterization for reflexive theories. It turns out to be possible to define a class of modal formulae which are under any arithmetical realization provably Σ2 in PRA. These are called essentially Σ2-formulas, we write ES2. Let us start by defining this class and some related classes. In our definition, A will stand for the set of all modal interpretability formulae.
We can now formulate Beklemishev's principle B.
Note that B is just Montagna's principle M restricted to ES2-formulas. Proof. Easy.
Arithmetical soundness of B
By Lemma 2.1 we know that PRA + σ is reflexive for any Σ2(PRA)-sentence σ. Thus, we get by Orey-Hájek that
Consequently, for σ ∈ Σ2(PRA), ¬(σ £PRA ψ) ∈ Σ2(PRA) and we see that, indeed, ∀ A∈ES2 ∀ * A * ∈ Σ2(PRA). This enables us to prove the arithmetical soundness of B. Proof. For some A ∈ ES2 and arbitrary B and C, we consider some realization * and let α := A * , β := B * and γ := C * . We reason in PRA and assume α £PRA β. As α is Σ2(PRA), we get by (1) that ∀x PPRA(α → QPRA,xβ).
We now consider n large enough (dependent on γ) such that
From general observations we have that, for large enough n,
Combining (2), (3), and using (4), we see that for any x, P(α ∧ Pγ → QPRA,n(β ∧ Pγ)). Clearly, α ∧ Pγ is still a Σ2(PRA)-sentence. 1 Again by (1) we get α ∧ Pγ £ β ∧ Pγ.
Let M
ESn be the schema A £ B → A ∧ PC £ B ∧ PC with A ∈ ESn. Theorem 5.1 can be generalized using results of [1] 
By x↑ we denote the set of worlds that lie above x w.r.t. the R relation. That is, x↑ := {y | xRy}. With ySx↑ we denote the set of those z for which ySxz.
We will consider frames both as modal models without a valuation and as structures for first-(or sometimes second) order logic. We say that a model M is based on a frame F if F is precisely M with the relation left out.
In this subsection we give the frame condition of Beklemishev's principle. Our frame condition holds on the class of finite frames. At first sight, the condition might seem a bit awkward. On second sight it is just the frame condition of M with some simulation built in. First we approximate the class ES2 by stages. . We now define some first order formulas Si(b, u) that say that two nodes in a frame b and u look alike. The larger i is, the more the two points look alike. We use the letter S as to hint at a simulation.
By induction on n we easily see that ∀n F |= Sn(b, b) for all frames F and all b∈F . For i ≥ 1 the relation Si(b, u) is in general not symmetric. However it is not hard to see that the Si are transitive and reflexive. Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on i. First consider the basis case, that is, i=0. Let b↑ be given by the finite set {xj}j∈J . We define y pj ↔ y=xj y r ↔ bRy.
It is now obvious that u A0 ⇔ u↑=b↑. 
Now we will see that under the new valuation
To this purpose we consider and fix some xj in b↑. We now see that For the class of finite frames, we can get rid of the universal quantification in the frame condition of Beklemishev's principle. Remember that depth(x), the depth of a point x, is the length of the longest chain of R-successors starting in x.
Proof. The proof goes by induction on n. For n = 0, the result is clear. So, we consider some x, x with Sn+1(x, x ) & depth(x) ≤ n + 1. We are done if we can show Sm+1(x, x ) for m ≥ n + 1. This, we prove by a subsidiary induction on m. The basis is trivial. For the inductive step, we assume Sm(x, x ) for some m ≥ n + 1 and set out to prove Sm+1(x, x ), that is
The first conjunct is precisely the induction hypothesis. For the second conjunct we reason as follows. As m ≥ n + 1, certainly Sn+1(x, x ). We consider y with xRy. By Sn+1(x, x ), we find a y with ySxy ∧ Sn(y, y ) ∧ y S x ↑ ⊆ ySx↑.
As xRy and depth(x) ≤ n + 1, we see depth(y) ≤ n. Hence by the main induction, we get that Sm(y, y ) and we are done. Definition 6.12. A B-simulation on a frame is a binary relation S for which the following holds.
If F is a finite frame that satisfies Ci for all i, we can consider T i∈ω Si. This will certainly be a B-simulation. Definition 6.13. The frame condition C B is defined as follows. F |= C B if and only if there is a B-simulation S on F such that for all x and y, xRy → ∃y (ySxy ∧ S(y, y ) ∧ ∀d, e (y SxdRe → yRd) ).
An immediate consequence of Lemma 6.11 is the following theorem.
Theorem 6.14. For F a finite frame, we have
Note that the M-frame condition can be seen as a special case of the frame condition of B: we demand that S be the identity relation.
It is not hard to see that the frame condition of M0 follows from C0. And indeed, ILB M0 as QA ∈ ES2 and A £ B → QA £ B. Actually, we have that ILB1 M0.
Beklemishev and Zambella
Zambella proved in [18] a fact concerning Π1-consequences of theories with a Π2 axiomatization. As we shall see, his result has some repercussions on the study of the interpretability logic of PRA.
Lemma 7.1 (Zambella). Let T and S be two theories axiomatized by Π2-axioms. If T and S have the same Π1-consequences then T + S has no more Π1-consequences than T or S.
In [18] , Zambella gave a model-theoretic proof of this lemma. As was sketched by G. Mints (see [3] ), also a finitary proof based on Herbrand's theorem can be given. This proof can certainly be formalized in the presence of the superexponentiation function, thus it yields a principle for the Π1-conservativity logic of Π2-axiomatized theories. We denote it here as Z Π 1 .
Since PRA is Π2 axiomatized and proves totality of the supexp function this principle applies to PRA. But there are repercussions for the interpretability logic of PRA as well. We know that for reflexive theories Π1-conservativity coincides with interpretability. We also know that any Σ2-extension of PRA is reflexive (Lemma 2.1). Altogether this means that a statement α £ β and α £Π 1 β are equivalent if α is in Σ2 and PRA + α is Π2-axiomatized, i.e. α is in ∆2. We arrive at Zambella's principle for interpretability logic:
For the Π1-conservativity logic of PRA, the principle Z Π 1 is really informative (see [3] ), it is the only principle know on top of the basic ones for the Π1-conservativity logic of PRA. The principle Z for interpretability logic is very interesting as well but it does turn out to be derivable in ILB as we will now proceed to show. (See however the final remark of this section.)
Here modal logic again proves to be informative -to have such a proof is interesting since it is not at all clear to us how the two principles relate arithmetically. We shall give a purely syntactical proof of ILB0 Z, B0 being a restriction of B to ED2 formulas, see Definition 6.8. The proof in [11] of the same fact was not correct.
Throughout the proof we consider a full disjunctive normal form of modal formulas: Definition 7.2. A full disjunctive normal form (a full DNF) over a finite set of formulas {C1, . . . , Cn} is a disjunction of conjunctions of the form ±C1 ∧ . . . ∧ ±Cn where +Ci means Ci and −Ci means ¬Ci, i.e., each Ci occurs either positively or negatively in each disjunct.
Each propositional formula is clearly equivalent to a formula in full DNF over the set of propositional atoms occurring in it. Similarly each modal ED2-formula, being a boolean combination of boxed formulas, is equivalent to a formula in full DNF over the set of its boxed subformulas, or even over any finite set of boxed formulas containing its boxed subformulas (or just its boxed subforumulas maximal w.r.t. box-depth). A disjunct D of either A or B is fully determined by the set D 2 of boxed formulas occurring positively in it. We shall write D 2 also for the conjunction of its members.
We first show, if D is a member of A or B which has a maximal set D
Suppose such D is in A, the other case is symmetrical. Since D £ A we have also D £ B. Then, noting that D 2 is a conjunction of boxed formulas and applying B0, we obtain D £ B ∧ D 2 . Now take any disjunct E of B for which E 2 does not contain D 2 . Then E contradicts D 2 by its negative part. We distinguish two cases: if for all E in B the set E 2 does not contain
But since D has a maximal Box-set, E and D must be the same and D occurs in B as well.
We have shown that all maximal disjuncts interpret A ∧ B.
We show by induction that the same is true for all other disjuncts of A and B. This suffices for the proof.
Assume that, for all k with m ≥ k > k and all disjuncts in either A or B with D 2 of size k , D £ A ∧ B (this has been already shown for k equal the size of the maximal Box-set in A and B certainly less then m). have size greater then k.
Actually it is possible to extend Zambella's principle somewhat in such a way that it is no longer clear whether the result is still derivable from B. First note that the formulas in ES2 are just the propositional combinations of P-formulas. Now let us allow in A, B not only P-formulas but also formulas of the form C £ D with C, D ∈ ES2. Let us furthermore write can still be seen to be valid using the same considerations that led us to the principle Z in the first place.
Delimitation of IL(PRA)
Let us see what we can conclude about IL(PRA) from the above. Certainly IL(PRA) includes IL(All) but it is more than that because B is not a principle of IL(All). The latter is clear from the fact that IL(All) ⊆ ILM ∩ ILP and Z is not in ILP: consider the following model: w p q S w
We have w Qp ≡ Qq and w p £ p ∧ q, thus Zambella fails. The model is clearly an ILP model. This shows, by derivability of Z from B, that indeed B is not a principle of IL(All).
Also we know that IL(PRA) is not ILM since M is not in IL(PRA), as A. Visser discusses in [17] : the two logics cannot be the same because if ILM is a part of the interpretability logic of a theory then it is a part of the interpretability logic of any of its finite extensions as well. This cannot be the case for PRA because not all of its finite extensions are reflexive. A more specific example of a principle of ILM which is not in IL(PRA) can be given:
A £ QB → P(A £ QB).
That this formula is not in IL(PRA) can be shown using Shavrukov's result from [14] about complexity of the set {ψ|ψ ∈ Π1 & φ £ ψ}; see [17] for the full proof.
We know that M0 is provable in ILB. The other principles surely contained in IL(PRA) are B, R and W (R * is the conjunction of R and W). Let us show they are mutually independent. Note that for nonderivability proofs soundness suffices. is an ILB frame and it violates the frame condition for W: wRxRy and xSwySwx and wRz. Now z is bi-similar to y and B is ensured.
R vs. B: Again, since R ∈ IL(All), it cannot be that R B.
The following frame is an ILB-frame violating the frame condition of R:
We have a basic situation violating R, xRyRzSxuRv and ¬zSyv.
To ensure B for y we add an arrow yRv, to ensure B for z, we add a bi-similar world z such that xRz and z has no successors at all.
R vs. W: already discussed in [8] .
It is clear from our exposition that, though we have solved a number of problems concerning IL(PRA), many remain open, e.g. those connected with our incomplete knowledge of IL(All). Also, we lack a modal completeness theorem for ILB. Unfortunately, the complexity of the frame condition for B makes this seem an intractable problem at the present time. In any case, the logic of interpetability is far from being a finished subject.
